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Abstract. Echo state networks are simple recurrent neural networks
that are easy to implement and train. Despite their simplicity, they show
a form of memory and can predict or regenerate sequences of data. We
make use of this property to realize a novel neural cryptography scheme.
The key idea is to assume that Alice and Bob share a copy of an echo
state network. If Alice trains her copy to memorize a message, she can
communicate the trained part of the network to Bob who plugs it into his
copy to regenerate the message. Considering a byte-level representation
of in- and output, the technique applies to arbitrary types of data (texts,
images, audio files, etc.) and practical experiments reveal it to satisfy the
fundamental cryptographic properties of diffusion and confusion.
1 Introduction
The emerging field of neural cryptography is a sub-field of cryptography that
deals with artificial neural networks for encryption and cryptanalysis.
Early contributions in this area considered cryptographic systems based on
recursive auto encoders and showed that feed-forward networks trained via back-
propagation can encrypt plain-text messages in the activation patterns of hidden
layer neurons [2]. Later work introduced key-exchange systems where coupled
neural networks synchronize to establish common secret keys [5]; while the origi-
nal approach was not completely secure [6], more recent work showed that mod-
ern convolutional interacting neural networks can indeed learn to protect their
communication against adversary eaves-droppers [1]. Another popular idea is
to combine chaotic dynamics and neural networks [7,8,11,12,13]. For example,
chaotic neural networks were used for image encryption and experimentally veri-
fied to be secure and chaotic Hopfield networks were found to be able to generate
random binary sequences for text encryption.
Given this short survey, the novel idea for neural cryptography proposed in
this paper can be seen as a hybrid approach that harnesses chaotic dynamics
and the deterministic outcome of a training procedure. Namely, we propose to
use echo state networks [3] both for encryption and decryption.
Considering the classic scenario where Alice and Bob exchange messages and
want to protect their communication against Eve’s eavesdropping, we assume
that both share an identical copy of an echo state network whose internal states
evolve according to a non-linear dynamical system. To encrypt a message (a
text, an image, etc.), Alice feeds it into her copy of the network and trains the
output weights such that the network reproduces the input. She then sends these
ar
X
iv
:1
70
4.
01
04
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  4
 A
pr
 20
17
output weights to Bob who uses them to run his copy of the network which will
regenerate the message. Eve, on the other hand, may retrieve the communicated
output weights, but without the corresponding echo state network (its structure,
input weights, and internal weights), she will not be able to decipher the message.
Our experiments with this kind of private-key or symmetric cryptography system
reveal the approach to be easy to use, efficient, scalable, and secure.
Next, we briefly summarize the basic theory behind echo state networks and
how to use them as auto encoders that memorize their input. We then discuss
how to harness them for cryptography and present experiments which underline
that our approach satisfies the fundamental cryptographic properties of diffusion
and confusion.
2 Echo State Networks as Memories
Echo state networks (ESNs) follow the paradigm of reservoir computing where a
large reservoir of recurrently interconnected neurons processes sequential data.
The central idea is to randomly generate weights W i ∈ Rnr×ni between input
and reservoir neurons as well as weights W r ∈ Rnr×nr between reservoir neu-
rons. Only the weights W o ∈ Rno×nr between reservoir and output neurons are
trained in order to adapt the network to a particular task.
At time t, the states of the input, output, and reservoir neurons are collected
in xt ∈ Rni , yt ∈ Rno , and rt ∈ Rnr , respectively, and their evolution over time
is governed by the following non-linear dynamical system
rt = (1− α)rt−1 + α fr
(
W rrt−1 +W ixt
)
(1)
yt = fo
(
W ort
)
(2)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is called the leaking rate. The function fr(·) is understood to act
component-wise on its argument and is typically a sigmoidal activation function.
For the output layer, however, fo(·) is usually just a linear or softmax function
depending on the application context.
To train an echo state network, one provides a training sequence of input
data x1,x2, . . . ,xT gathered in a matrix X ∈ Rni×T together with a sequence
of desired outputs y1,y2, . . . ,yT gathered in Y ∈ Rno×T . The training sequence
is fed into the network and the internal activations that result from iterating
equation (1) are recorded in a matrix R = [r1, r2, . . . , rT ] ∈ Rnr×T . Appropriate
output weights W o can then be determined using least squares
W o = Y RT (RRT + βI)−1 (3)
where β is a regularization constant. However, for a good practical performance,
the scale a of W i and the spectral radius ρ of W r have to be chosen carefully.
Together with the leaking rate α, these parameters are rather task specific, yet,
useful, commonly adhered to general guidelines are given in [9].
Because of its recurrent connections, the reservoir of an echo state network
can be understood as a non-linear high-dimensional expansion of the input data
that has a memory of the past. The temporal reach of this memory is called
“memory capacity” and bounded by the number of reservoir neurons [4]. An
entire input sequence (e.g. a text file) can therefore be stored in- and retrieved
from the reservoir provided the reservoir is large enough. Hence, our idea in this
paper is to produce an echo state network with a large reservoir and to train it to
memorize an input sequence. Once the training is complete, we let the network
run freely to (re)generate the memorized sequence.
3 ESN-Based Encryption and Decryption
We consider the classic cryptographic scenario where Alice and Bob want to
secure their communication against Eve’s eavesdropping. Using a secret key,
Alice converts her messages known as plaintexts into encrypted messages known
as ciphertexts. She then sends the cyphertexts to Bob who uses the same key to
convert them back into plaintexts.
Given this setup, our idea is to “memorize” a given message using an echo
state network at one end of a communication channel and to “recall” it at the
other end using the same network. If Alice and Bob share an identical copy of
the network, Alice can train it to memorize the data and transmits only the
resulting weights W o over the insecure channel. Bob then plugs these weights
into his copy of the network and runs it to reconstruct Alice’s message. In other
words, the weight matrices W i and W r and leaking rate α of the echo state
network constitute the secret key of our cryptographic system. Without it Eve
can not decipher the transmitted cyphertext W o.
3.1 Representing Data
In our practical implementations of the above scheme, we consider byte-level
representations of messages. This allows for flexibility and wide applicability
because, in the memory of a computer, texts or images are represented as a
byte-stream after all. To further increase flexibility, we consider a “one hot”
encoding of individual bytes where each of the 256 possible values is represented
as a 256-dimensional binary vector.
3.2 Memorizing Data
Given any byte sequence B = [b1, b2, . . . , bN ] of input data, we train and apply
an echo state network as follows: First, we append a dummy byte b0 at the
beginning of the original sequence B so as to make the later recall process
independent of the value of the original first byte in the sequence. Second, we
encode the resulting sequence to obtain H = [h0,h1, . . . ,hN ] where each hi is a
binary vector of length 256. Given H, we then set the in- and output sequence
for an echo state network to
X = [h0,h1, . . . ,hN−1] (4)
Y = [h1,h2, . . . ,hN ] (5)
where the indices of the vectors in sequences X and Y differ by one time step.
Given an echo state network with input weights W i and reservoir weights W r,
we then iterate the system in (1) and (2) and learn appropriate output weights
W o according to (3).
3.3 Recalling Data
Once W o has been determined, it can be plugged into an identical copy of the
echo state network at the other end of a communication channel. This network
can then regenerate the encoded message one element at a time. To this end, we
consider the dummy byte b0 and “one hot” encode it to obtain x0 = h0. Using
this as the first input to the network, we run the system in (1) and (2) to obtain
yt from xt. At each time step, we consider the network output yt, which is not
necessarily a binary vector, as a vector of probabilities for different bytes. We
thus subject it to the softmax function which returns a 1 for the most likely entry
and 0s for all others. The resulting binary vector is then used as the input xt+1
for the next iteration of the network. Moreover, we decode the binary vectors
obtained in each iteration into bytes bt and collect them in a matrix S, which is
exactly the original sequence B memorized by the echo state network.
3.4 Working with “Data Chunks”
As the size N of data sequence increases, the size nr ∈ O(N) of a reservoir that
can memorize it increases, too. This makes the matrix multiplications W rrt
required for the network’s state updates expensive. In fact, the total cost for N
internal updates will be of order O(N3) and, to reduce this cost, we adopt a
“divide-and-conquer” strategy where we split the data into chunks of size m and
employ a small reservoir to memorize each chunk at an effort of O(m3). Hence,
for an entire sequence, i.e. for Nm chunks, efforts reduce toO(Nm×m3) = O(Nm2).
4 Experiments and Results
In our practical experiments, we found that echo state networks used as described
above can indeed memorize and perfectly recall different types of data such as
texts, images, audio files, videos, archives, etc. In this section we report results
obtained from different kinds of security analysis of our cryptographic scheme.
The parametrization of the echo state networks considered in these experiments
is summarized in Tab. 1.
4.1 Security analysis
Any cryptography system should be robust against common types of attacks such
as brute force attacks, known-plaintext attacks, and ciphertext-only attacks. A
brute force attack is an attack in which an attacker attempts to find the keys
of the system through trial and error. It is evident from the Tab. 1 that the
Table 1: Echo state network configuration
parameter value
chunk size m 200 (reservoir size nr chosen as 0.95×m)
leaking rate α 0.07
spectral radius ρ of W r 1.0
input scaling a of W i 0.5
random seed randomly chosen
input connectivity input neurons are connected to 30 % of reservoir neurons
reservoir connectivity reservoir neurons are connected to 30% of reservoir neurons
activation function f logistic for the reservoir and softmax for the output
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Fig. 1: Key sensitivity: (a),(e) original images; (b),(f) decrypted images using
the same key (echo state network) as used for encryption; both decrypted images
are identical to the originals; (c),(d),(g),(h) decrypted images using slightly mod-
ified keys, i.e. slightly modified echo state networks; here, all decrypted images
differ considerably from the original images.
key space of our proposed system is very large and most of the parameters
are unbounded. This renders brute force attacks extremely time consuming and
practically infeasible.
Figures 1(a) and (e) show two original images one of which (Lena) was given
as a tiff file, the other (cat) as a png file. Both were encrypted and decrypted
using the same echo state network. Decryption produced the images in Fig. 1(b)
and (f) which are identical to the original ones. However, when decrypting with
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Fig. 2: Plaintext sensitivity: (a),(f) original images; (b),(g) encrypted images;
(c),(h) original images with 1% of their pixels randomly distorted; (d),(i) en-
cryptions of the modified images; (e),(j) difference between encrypted original
and encrypted modified images (33.22% and 37.78%, respectively).
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Fig. 3: Ciphertext sensitivity: (a),(b) plaintext distribution of the Lena im-
age and corresponding ciphertext distribution; (c),(d) plaintext distribution of
the cat image and corresponding ciphertext distribution. Since the ciphertext
distributions are almost identical, frequency analysis is difficult and the system
is robust against ciphertext-only attacks.
networks with slightly modified parameters, i.e. when using slight variations of
the secret key, we obtained useless images as shown in Fig. 1(c), (d), (g), and (h).
These results are prototypical and show that the system is highly sensitive to the
secret key. This makes it robust against brute force attacks because decryption
is only possible if all the parameters of the secret key are set precisely.
Known-plaintext attacks are ones where an attacker has access to an example
of a plaintext (a message) and a corresponding ciphertext (a weight matrix W o)
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Fig. 4: Run times for encryption and decryption for different message sizes.
and attempts to crack the secret key via a comparative analysis of changes
between them. For instance, by analyzing changes in the ciphertexts of images
which differ by just a few pixels, it might possible to obtain part of the mapping
involved in encryption. Figures 2(a) and (f) show original images and Figs. 2(c)
and (h) show slightly distorted versions where 1% of the pixels were randomly
changed. The corresponding encrypted images (matrices W o) are visualized in
Fig. 2(b), (g), (d), and (i). Only small changes in the plaintext led to considerable
changes in the chiphertext; these differences are visualized in Fig. 2(e) and (j)
and amount to about 35%. Thus, our system is sensitive to slight modification
of the plaintext and therefore renders known-plaintext attacks very difficult.
In ciphertext-only attacks, an attacker has access to a set of ciphertexts,
however has some knowledge about statistical distribution of plaintexts. Using
frequency analysis of ciphertexts, for instance, exploiting the fact that “e” is the
most frequent character in English texts, one can map the most frequent parts in
a ciphertext to corresponding plaintexts. Figure 3 shows frequency distributions
for the plaintexts and ciphertexts of the images “Lena” and “cat”. Although the
plaintext distributions of two images differ, their ciphertext distributions are very
similar. From these distributions it is evident that most of the elements (≈ 50%)
in the ciphertext (W o) are zero and that the non-zero elements are uniformly
distributed. Thus, frequency analysis will be ineffective and the proposed system
is robust against ciphertext-only attacks.
According to Shannon [10], diffusion and confusion are the two fundamen-
tal properties of a good cryptography system. A system that has the diffusion
property is one where a small change in either plaintext or key causes a large
change in the ciphertext. A system with the confusion property is one where the
mapping between plaintext and ciphertext is complex. Our experimental results
indicate that the proposed system has both these properties.
4.2 Performance
To evaluate the runtime performance of our proposed system, we determined
average encryption and decryption times for messages of different sizes. Our
results are shown in Fig. 4. For instance, encrypting and decrypting a 3KB
message took less than one second each and runtimes were found to increase
linearly with the message size. Our approach therefore scales well and can be
used in real-time applications.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel neural cryptography scheme based on the
capability of echo state networks to memorize and reproduce sequences of input
data. The proposed system was found to be robust against common security
attacks and satisfies the fundamental cryptographic properties of diffusion and
confusion. Moreover, our approach is scalable, suitable for real-time applications,
and does not require special purpose hardware (such as GPUs) for its computa-
tions.
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